ABSTRACT
The centrality of federalism and citizenship in the discourse and analysis of African government and politics cannot be overemphasized. Being a continent characterized by ethnic plurality, religious and cultural diversities, the quest to design and evolve federal institutions and policies that fosters popular political participation, guarantee ethno-cultural tolerance, cooperation and national unity, undoubtedly, constitutes a major challenge. This study therefore, examined the complex relationships between federal institutional arrangements, governmental policies, citizenship and national identity in Africa, drawing on the Ethiopian and Nigerian federal experiences. Relying mainly on secondary data, qualitative analysis that comprises comparative institutional method, the study sought to compare citizenship and decentralization provisions of the FDRE 1994 Constitution and the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended). The study revealed that ethno-federalist provisions of these constitutions, as well as other consociational policies meant to guarantee ethno-territorial self-governance, equitable distribution of resources/opportunities have tended to exacerbate the same problems they were meant to resolve in the first instance. Similarly, although citizenship remained an exclusive national constitution matter, effective citizenship and rights were only operative at the localities through differentiated ethnic belongings as indigenes of such localities. Thus, attenuating perpetual tensions between the notions of liberal citizenship and republican citizenship based on indigeneity. Furthermore, the study revealed that the contradictions set forth by the indigeneity-citizenship nexus are at the core of the many crises threatening to tear these federations apart. The study concludes that genuine negotiations, consensus-building and strategic alliance between the elites of the various ethnic groups are the first step at resolving these contradictions and attenuate the conflict-ridden intergroup relations in these federations. There is also the need to pay adequate attention to the constitutional imperative of separating indigeneity and citizenship rights. This can be achieved by limiting the former to certain traditional rites, rituals, titles and stools, while democratizing the latter through access and political participation based on continuous residency in any part of the federations. Lastly, is the urgent need to engender viable and efficient governance mechanism that promotes sustained economic growth, reduce unemployment and poverty, particularly among the active segment of the population.

Keywords: Federalism, Citizenship, Indigeneity, Consociational Democracy, Ethnic Conflict, National Identity/Unity.

1. INTRODUCTION
The essence of a modern state is citizenship, without which such a state loses its soul. This is the case since a state remains a mere abstraction in the absence of people (citizens) that are called by its name, who builds institutions on its behalf. Indeed, there is an unbreakable link between the modern state and citizenship despite the arguments of liberalists and/or globalists for the idea of global citizenship or citizenship despite the state within the matrix of market-based globalization (Oladeji 2012). Put differently, citizenship refers to the idea or the fact of belonging to a state without which the idea of the state will be meaningless. Thus, citizens are the people who compose the political community, and who, in their associational capacities, have established and submitted themselves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their general welfare and the protection of their individual as well as collective rights. They are “full members of the political community who participate actively (sometimes passively or indifferently) in the creation and/or sharing of the assets/liabilities of the political community” (Oladeji 2012).
Ordinarily, citizenship is a matter of a national law and there ought to be no discriminations among co-nationals as to the terms of rights and privileges enjoyed as members of the same state. In other words, citizenship entitles a person to certain rights – residency in any part of the state, freedom of intra-state migration, political participation either as a voter or as a candidate seeking elective or appointive public office, unfettered access to public goods/services, and diplomatic protection when outside the country – often denied noncitizens. However, the diversity and pluralism that constitute the hallmark of most African States’ social and political life provides a fairly unique context for framing the question of citizenship (Egwu 2004). Indeed, in a continent where a former president and a former prime minister (Kenneth Kaunda and Alison Quattara¹) have suddenly been declared not to be citizens of the countries of which they were president and prime minister – Zambia and Côte d’Ivoire, respectively – suggests that one must necessarily approach the issues of citizenship with a good deal of circumspection (Ohe 2004).

It is therefore, not surprising that citizenship has been central to the analyses of the crises of state in Africa (Adejumobi 2001; Adesoji and Alao 2009; Alubo 2009; Keller and Omwami 2007; Mamdani 1996; Nyamnjoh 2007; Pelican 2009). Thus, such problems as those of communal and intra/inter-ethnic conflicts and violence, civil wars, ethnic cleansing, and political and democratic problematic etc. are often attributed to the actuality of the dynamics and contradictions inherent in the issues of citizenship (Oladjeji 2012). To attenuate the conflict-ridden intergroup relations, ensure ethnic-balancing and national cohesion, African leaders are divided between those that favour Unitarism and those that argue for Federalism. The protagonists of a unitary power structure argue that it is the best model to ensure national cohesion and forge nation-state out of the divergent communities that make up the state. To be sure, in the immediate post-colonial period, some African leaders held federalism in contempt as a system that would exacerbate tribalism and encourage secessionist tendency. In fact, they did not only view the federal arrangement as ‘a divide and rule strategy’ (Dersso 2008), but also perceived it as ‘a crisis escalator rather than a crisis damper’ (Elaigwu 1994).

Thus, it came less as a surprise when many post-independence African leaders opted for the unitary state or centralised administrative system as one capable of fostering national unity and identity. In fact, some of them regarded decentralisation within a unitary state as an unsafe administrative/political risk. In the context of this thinking, they perceived the establishment of unitary state as effective means for maintaining national sameness in Africa’s plural societies, composed of diverse ethnic groups that were expected to give up their identities for the sake of national unity (Omotoso and Oladjeji Forthcoming). But no sooner than later, the unitary systems began to falter and failed to achieve the flaunted nation-state. If anything, the centralised state escalates rather than minimises ethnic problems due to appropriation of states resources to the central government. The centralization of resources readily turns political contestations – i.e. elections – into inter-ethnic confrontations/wars since any ethnic group or coalition of ethnic groups that controls the state controls so much more – power, security, wealth, and the good life. Little wonder that many states in Africa soon became theatres of inter-ethnic wars over whom/which group controls the state².

Given the failure of unitary state to bring together diverse groups to form an ‘idealised nation-state’ and/or achieve the flaunted economic prosperity, federalism emerged in the twilight of the last century, especially within the context of democratising and decentralising the many one-party totalitarian central states, as the political arrangement that best suited the African situation (Agbu 2004; Ibrahim 2003; Jinadu 2007; Osaghae 2014; Selassie 2003). Indeed, it is today a prevalent assumption that the federal system of government has several advantages for Africa because of the need to constrain limitless political power, accommodate diversity, recognize and protect group and individual rights, protect some groups from oppression through local self-government and local autonomy, allow such groups to preserve their identity, provide the desired economic benefits through efficient service delivery, equitable development and poverty reduction, and legitimize the state by giving various groups a sense of belonging among others.

This paper therefore, undertakes an interrogation of the performance of federalism in ensuring institutional stability and democratic non-discriminatory citizenship in Africa. Specifically, the paper critically examined the complex relationships between federal institutional arrangements and/or policies, citizenship and national identity in Africa by drawing on the federal experiences of Ethiopia and Nigeria. The rest of the paper is therefore arranged into five sections: conceptual/theoretical issues in citizenship and federalism, state formation and emergence of politicised identities in Africa, citizenship provisions in the Ethiopian and Nigerian constitutions, ethno-federalism and citizenship dilemmas in Ethiopia and Nigeria, and concluding remarks.

2. CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL ISSUES IN CITIZENSHIP AND FEDERALISM

With respect to citizenship in every modern state, two major theoretical constructs are normally appropriated – liberalism and civic republicanism. In the liberal tradition, citizenship is a status that entitles individuals to specific set of universal rights granted by the

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¹ Alison Quattara is currently the President of Côte d’Ivoire
² This is mostly due to elitist manipulation of ethnicity and other ascribed identities by ethnic entrepreneurs as instruments for gaining, exercising and retaining political power. In some cases it has resulted in wars in countries like Ethiopia, Nigeria, Egypt, Mali, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kenya, CAR, DRC, among others. The worst case till date would probably be the 1994 genocide in Rwanda that was characterized by the attempted extermination of the Tutsi minority group in the country by the extremists among the Hutu majority group, which claimed almost a million lives in just 100 days (see United States Institute of Peace, 2008: 3).
state (Heather 1999; Gaventa 2002; Kabeer 2002, 2005). McGregor (1999) explains the liberal notion of citizenship as “individualism and the central idea that all individuals are equal and have inalienable rights (e.g., human rights) that cannot be revoked by the state or any social institution”. This notion of citizenship presupposes that an individual possesses equal respect/right along with other members of the polity (Gibney 2006). From the liberals’ points of view therefore, citizenship connotes a legal-juridical status enjoyed equally by rational and self-interested individuals, granted and protected by the state (Jones and Gaventa 2002).

In the civic republican tradition, citizenship centres on the notion of the socially-embedded citizen, community belonging and priority of the common good (Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Isin and Wood 1999; Georgina 2003). To this school of thought, citizenship is an expression of one’s membership in a political community. It is a status built upon a particularly intense solidarity between the individual and the community or society. In contrast to liberalism that assumes that citizenship and rights exist prior to and outside of the community, civic republicanism emphasises the importance of community to individual identity and the obligation of citizens to participate in communal affairs. Therefore, in the civic republican notions of citizenship, there is no direct link between an individual and the state; an individual is a citizen because the group to which he belongs is a part of the state.

Applied to the African situation, the legal injunction which assumes that all citizens are equal is liberal citizenship, while that which requires belonging to an ethnic group indigenous to a particular locality is civic republican. Because some African countries explicitly restrict citizenship rights on racial or ethnic bases (Manby 2016), some have classified African states as “states without citizens” (Ayoade 1988), or as Taiwo (1996) contends that “there are no citizens in Africa, only citizens of Africa”. Thus, by tying an individual’s rights and privileges to the indigenous group of origin, most African states foster a form of citizenship based on the civic republican principle wherein the relationship between the individual and the state is intermediated by primary identity groups (Osaghae 1990). This construction of citizenship on the exclusionary and discriminatory basis of indigeneity, which has also tended to freeze colonially-induced inequalities, has been a major source of conflicts among indigenes, settlers, migrants, strangers, minorities, and so on (Osaghae 2014).

To resolve the identity-based conflicts and citizenship crises, especially in plural societies, the last two decades or so have witnessed increased theoretical and practical supports among scholars and policy formulators for federalism as the best institutional arrangement to tame inter group suspicions, conflicts and provide multiple levels of citizenship that guarantees individual rights. To be sure, a survey suggests that since 1980 about 95% of all countries have conferred powers and responsibilities to sub-national units ‘with varying degrees of political, administrative and fiscal competences’ (Schrotshammer and Kievelitz 2006). This popularity may not be unconnected with the perception that federalism helps to manage the multitude of demands of diverse groups by deflating national level inter-group conflicts for power, resources and control, particularly in nations with diverse ethno-religious-cultural groups, which are regionally concentrated.

The literature on the essence of federalism for an inclusive citizenship in plural society is divided into two main categories – the legal and cultural pluralism literature. The legal literature, which is ably represented by the work of Vicki Jackson (Jackson 2001) and Peter Schucks (Schuck 2000), argues that, by the nature of its political arrangement that divides political power between a national government and sub-national governments/polities, federal state involves duality/multiplicity of citizenships. The legal protagonists also argue that a constituent state retains the right of service provisioning for its ‘citizens’ denied to co-nationals not resident within its area of jurisdiction. But, despite the notion of multilayered citizenship embedded in federalism, citizens are free to internally migrate from and/or reside in any part of the ‘nation-state’ and thus become ‘resident-citizens’ of the new location with full membership/citizenship rights as enjoyed by other citizens of the new place.

Thus, the citizenship by residency becomes possible through the intervening powers of the national government over the issues of migration and citizenship (Jackson 2001; Schuck 2000). Also, it is made possible as a result of the sanctity of liberal idea of citizenship, which recognises formal equality of all citizens irrespective of where they reside within the state (Beaud 2002 in Ejobowah 2013). More so, it is partly due to the fact that most federal constitutions make citizenship an exclusive legislative matter on which only the national government can legislate. In this sense, it is believed that federalism maintains a differential treatment of citizens without generating severe conflicts (Ejobowah 2013).

However, contrary to the legal literature that argues for formal equality citizenship, cultural pluralists argue in favour of differentiated or indigeneity-based citizenship. One of the most influential theorists of cultural pluralism is Iris Marion Young. According to Young (1989), “any attempt to create a universal conception of citizenship which transcends group differences is fundamentally unjust because it oppresses historically excluded groups”. The main principle upon which cultural pluralists based their arguments is the ancient Principle of First Occupancy. The principle holds that the first group of people (indigenes/autochthones) to settle permanently on a piece of land before the ascendance of ‘others’ (latecomers) acquire perpetual moral rights over the land as far as sovereignty is concerned (Waldron 2002). Thus, indigeneity relates to the notion of those who could trace their ancestral heritage to a piece of land or a particular territory prior to the ascendance of others usually referred to as settlers (Oladeji 2005). Little wonder that
‘people are often thought of, and/or think of themselves, as being rooted in a place and deriving their identity from that rootedness’ (Malkki 2001).

The major argument of the cultural pluralists, therefore, is that federal institutions should be arranged in a way that each group (ethnic/indigenous group) has self-government at homeland. They contend that genuine equality lies in affirming rather than rejecting group differences in a multinational state. Thus, it is injustice in ethnically heterogeneous state to impose the identity/values of a dominant group upon the other groups (minorities). Justice involves ethno-cultural-religious inclusion and protection of group’s identity through self-determination rights. Thus, mutual recognition of the diversities in a state ‘would invite differentiated citizenship rights, which may take the form of federal constitutional arrangement in which groups are internally self-governing (Ejobowah 2013).

This also involves affirmative principles/policies to reverse real/perceived historical injustices in order to placate historically disadvantaged groups. For instance, in Nigeria the strategies for ensuring ethno-cultural-religious balance and justice include ethno-federalism – that bifurcated Nigeria into states and local governments along ethnico-cultural-religious cleavages – quota system, catchment area in admitting students into some federal institutions, federal character principle, and rotating the key political offices among the country’s geopolitical zones. In Ethiopia, it involves ethno-federal constitutional arrangement, which organises the country into self-governing regional states with autonomous powers to establish own legislative, executive and judicial bodies and self-determination on issues of culture, language, religion etc. The Ethiopian constitution also gives each region/ethnic group right of secession from the country. Thus, cultural pluralists believe that the common rights of citizenship cannot accommodate the special needs of minority groups. It is their contention that these groups can only be included and integrated into the common culture through “differential citizenship” (Young, 1989).

But as a concept, indigeneity ‘is highly politicised, is subject to particularities, and its application has ambivalent, sometimes paradoxical, outcomes’ (Pelican 2009: 52). To define indigenous peoples simply as those who ‘were there first and are still there, and so have rights to their lands’ (Maybury-Lewis 2005), is to incite inquiry about the reality of internal and external migration and the political, cultural, economic and historical factors that have configured competing articulations of being indigenous (Nyamnjoh 2010). To be sure, in Africa defining which groups may count as indigenous is much more problematic and controversial, as there are long and ongoing histories of migration, assimilation, and conquest (Pelican 2009). In fact, before Africa’s encounter with colonialism, composition of societies was fluid in nature and membership was not fixed. People could move from one geographic location to another and join other groups and easily acquired the identity of that location (Ojong and Sithole 2007; Lentz 2000; Adesoji and Alao 2009).

Examples of the scenario painted above can be found in the Swahili civilization in East Africa, pre-colonial models of community in north-western Ghana (Lentz 2000), and the process of state formations among different Nigerian groups (Adesoji and Alao 2009). During this period, there was no discrimination on the basis of descent, period of arrival or even extent of stay. Indeed, Kopytoff (in Pelican 2009:52-3) argues that African societies tend to reproduce themselves at their internal frontiers, thus continuously creating and re-creating a dichotomy between original inhabitants and latecomers along which political prerogatives are negotiated. This recurrent process does not allow for permanent and clear-cut distinctions of first nations versus dominant societies, as implied by the universal notion of “indigenous peoples’” (Pelican 2009: 53).

It is in view of the foregoing arguments that critics of differentiated citizenship worry that if groups are encouraged by the very terms of citizenship to turn inward and focus on their ‘difference’ (whether racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, and so on), then ‘the hope of a larger fraternity of all … will have to be abandoned’ (Glazer 1983). That is, citizenship will cease to be a device to cultivate a sense of community and a common sense of purpose (Heater 1990). This means that nothing will bind the various groups in society together and prevent the spread of mutual mistrust or conflict (Kukathas 1993). Also, differentiated citizenship is capable of creating what can be termed ‘politics of grievance’. To be sure, if only the oppressed groups are entitled to differential citizenship, this may encourage ethno-cultural-religious entrepreneurs to feign a perception of disadvantage in order to secure group claims/rights. This is very obvious in the context of Nigeria’s elite-inspired ‘politics of marginalization’. The various claims of marginalization and exclusion among and within the so called majority and minority enclaves in Nigeria not only neutralize such claims but make them elitist and fictitious.

3. STATE FORMATION AND EMERGENCE OF POLITICISED IDENTITIES IN ETHIOPIA AND NIGERIA

The emergence of the modern state is usually either through internal expansionist conquests or external imposition via colonial diktat. For instance, the modern Ethiopian state emerged through the expansionist empire-building of Emperor Tewodros around the 1850s and consolidated by Emperor Menelik II through successful prosecution of expansionist wars and incorporation of Oromo and other southern Ethiopia kingdoms into the Shewa Kingdom around late 1870s and early 1880s (Merera 2004; Temesgen 2015). On the other hand, Nigeria emergence as a state was through a ‘marriage of convenience’ when the British colonialists forced the many previously autonomous and diverse kingdoms into a state. Despite differential process of state consolidation between Ethiopia and Nigeria, the two countries, like most states in Africa, have been seriously assailed by ethno-cultural-religious diversity. But while the problem may
not be as a result of differential state formation process, it is located within the ability of the state and its custodians to consolidate the state through peaceful integration of its diverse peoples into ‘national political community’ as citizens on equal terms. Put differently, the emergence of indigeneity vis-à-vis citizenship problematic in Africa cannot be delinked from the historical emergence of modern state and how the state was and is being administered. Thus, while modern state in Ethiopia and Nigeria emerged differently, the way the two states have been administered makes ethno-cultural-religious identities rife and ‘national citizenship’ problematic.

3.1 The Nigerian Experience

When the British colonialists forged Nigeria out of the disparate kingdoms, their intention was not to create a stable/coherent ‘nation-state’, it was rather to isolate one of their spheres of influence from those of other ‘scarcumbling’ European powers and to satisfy their glutonous extractive tendencies at the expense of the colony. But to execute the colonial mandate of resource extraction, the colonialists, unlike in the ‘pre-colonial traditional states’ when power and resources were highly dispersed, transferred the ownership and control of resources from the people to the centralised colonial state (Ake 1985). To achieve this, pre-colonial traditional ruling elites of the various kingdoms were co-opted into the colonial state administration through what later became known as the ‘Indirect Rule Policy’ through ‘Native Authority’. This policy was modelled after the post-jihad emirate/caliphate politico-administrative system in the Northern Region and was imposed throughout the colonial state.

However, despite the imposition of cultural sameness, ethno-cultural difference was indispensable to the implementation of Indirect Rule (Ochonu 2008). That is, inherent in the policy of Indirect Rule was the paradox of ethno-cultural homogeneity and difference. Put differently, while the Caliphate administrative system became a model of governance throughout the country, each ethnic group must prove historical ethnic purity/difference from other ethnic groups to have its own Native Authority. The point being made is that the two fundamental prerequisites of Indirect Rule – ethnic difference and a pre-existing centralized system of rule – necessitated the creation, writing or unwriting, of both difference and politico-cultural sameness across Nigeria, using the colonially-approved Hausa-caliphate model as a reference (Ochonu 2008: 95).

Thus, colonial native authority policy has implications for the emergence and reification of the politically charged ethnic categories, especially indigeneity, in Nigeria. One, the policy gave vent to what can be described as false consciousness among the so-called ‘indigenous groups’ within localities who see themselves as the rightful heir to not just the traditional stool of their communities, but also the political control of Local Councils as part and/or extension of their inherited customary rights to the exclusion of non-indigenes (Oladeji 2012:12). Two, it resulted in the politicization of towns’ histories since the colonial state built local administration on traditional power holders who were able to claim authority through recourse to history. This politicization of towns’ histories by the state meant that these became potentially powerful tools reflecting the ambitions of (royal) individuals and their supporters (Nolte 2013) to claim indigeneity either to justify administrative rule over a territory or to gain administrative autonomy from a Native Authority.

Three, it led also to what Moses Ochonu has described as “colonialism within colonialism” (Ochonu 2008) among the ‘pagan’ groups of the Middle Belt of Nigeria where the colonial powers not only imposed alien system of government, but also sought to or imposed the leadership of Hausa/Fulani chiefs whose origin and tradition were clearly different from those of ‘indigenous groups’. Similar problems were encountered among the Igbos where the colonial powers had to result to the invention of what was called ‘Warrant Chiefs’ due to lack of pre-colonial traditional structure amenable to native authority rule. Four and a corollary to three, it bred fears of cultural assimilation or domination in cases where two or more ethnic groups were ‘lumped together’ in one native administration. Thus, the colonial imposition of the paramount ruler of one group as permanent native authority even when there was no pre-colonial history of dependent relations encouraged local autonomist agitations.

Moreover, the reification of the indigene/settler dichotomy in Nigeria also found impetus in the colonial federal policy, which balkanised the colonial state into three regions based on ethnic dominance of the three major ethnic groups – Igbo in the East, Hausa/Fulani in the North, and Yoruba in the West. At independence, all the regions sought to use indigeneity to offer their peoples special protections in the Nigerian environment (Adamu, 2002). Further fragmentation of the country into smaller political units over the years has made the situation worse. Thus, the progressive transformation of Nigeria’s original three regions into myriad of states and local governments means that the territorial space within which a Nigerian citizen can presently claim indigenous status is far smaller than it used to be (Bach 2004). As a consequence, communities which previously belong to the same political units and shared the same rights and privileges as indigenes suddenly find themselves on the opposite sides of the divide, one indigene, the other not.
non-indigene, the former enjoying privileges hitherto enjoyed jointly, the latter on his own, deprived of the rights s/he had in the past enjoyed in the same community. Though, s/he is still indigenous to his place of residence, local political arithmetic alters her/his life suddenly, bringing her/him in sharp conflict and state of animus with her/his former sister and neighbour.

However, while the indigeneity and citizenship questions were formally developed and entrenched in the colonial state, the scope and nature of the questions have been broadened since Nigeria’s political independence in 1960. In fact, through some state policies, the postcolonial Nigerian state tend to reproduce and/or turn the “colonial state” upside down by creating multiple layers of “socio-political identities”, “rights”, and “citizens” in Nigeria (cf. Bach 1989). As a matter of longstanding government policy, every Nigerian is either an indigene or a non-indigene of the place where they reside (HRW 2006). To be sure, the legal distinction between indigenous and settler Nigerian citizens was explicitly developed in the 1979 Nigeria constitution (Akanji 2011; Oladeji 2005; Osaghae 1990; Bach 1989). For instance, the 1979 Constitution in Section 277(1) interprets the phrase “belong to” in reference to a person in a State “either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents was a member of a community indigenous to that state.” This section was imported unchanged into the 1999 Constitution in Section 318(1). Henceforth, Nigerian citizens are dichotomised as indigenes and settlers and thus have no rights to indigeneity outside their states or ancestral homelands/local governments.

More specifically, the rootedness of the indigeneity clause in Nigerian body polity can be seen as an offshoot of the codification of the ‘Federal Character Principle’ in the 1979 constitution. Despite the well publicized defects of this approach to inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria (Osoba and Usman 1976), it was carried unchanged into Nigeria’s 1999 constitution. If anything, the issue of indigeneity gained additional pre-eminence due to the adoption of increasingly precise guidelines and the establishment of a Federal Character Commission endowed with the ability to monitor and control access to positions in the civil service (Third Schedule, Nigerian 1999 Constitution, as amended). The implication of this for local political participation and citizenship rights in Nigeria shall be examined in some details later. But in the main, the principle has all but reduced sources of tensions, not least due to the creation of additional areas for controversy (Bach 2004).

3.2 The Ethiopian Experience
When Emperors Tewodros and Menelik started the process of state building in Ethiopia, the dream was to build a united and centralised empire-state (Merera 2004; Muhabee 2015; Temesgen 2015). But, despite the foundational recognition of the Ethiopian ‘national unity and centralised cultural sameness’ as the dominant policy of the emerging ‘empire-state’, ethnicity or ethno-religious difference was still integral to the earlier state building processes in Ethiopia. To be sure, Tewodros, in challenging the feudal anarchy and the supremacy of the Oromo princes in the Abyssinian kingdom, consciously made ethnicity a major factor of his state policy. Also by 1882 Menelik had successfully conquered the battle of Embabo and brought all the kingdoms to the east, west and south of Shewa under the expanded Shewa kingdom and established the modern Ethiopia as centralised unitary state. During this period the Shewa Amhara elite was the dominant power centre of the state. Since then, the Shewan Amhara ethno-cultural-religious and linguistic values dominated the multinational Ethiopian state. Indeed, ethnicity has been one of the major factors in the modus operandi of the Ethiopian state, albeit implicitly until the 1960s (Merera 2004).

With the consolidation of the state, the process of ensuring a united ‘nation-state’ of Ethiopia began with what was then known as Makinat. Makinat (means pacification) included ethno-cultural-linguistic assimilation/acculturation and political domination of the ‘indigenous group’ into the evolving dominant national culture based on Amharisation. Amharisation involved the elevation/imposition of the Amhara culture as the national culture and Amharic language as the official language of the Ethiopian state (Addis Hiwot 1975; Teshale 1995). The Amharic language was also adopted as the language of instruction in pre-secondary schools. Amharisation equally included Ketemas (garrison towns) based on politico-military control to enforce ethno-cultural domination as state policy. The garrison towns were rule through what was called neftega (settlers) administration/dominion of economic, military and political institutions of the newly conquered territory of the southern Ethiopia.

Thus, the land of the ‘indigenous’ people, the mainstay of their socio-economic survival, was forcefully annexed by the military administrators (Gebru 1996). It must however be pointed out that different policy was adopted in the North, which underscored the dichotomised relations between northern and southern Ethiopia until 1974 (Merera 2004). However, the state sponsored ethno-cultural-linguistic domination, especially Amharic language policy, soon met with stiff opposition especially among non-Amharic speaking people, especially the Oromo people, who needed interpreters in dealing with state officials, especially in courts, and finding it difficult to get employment with the state bureaucracy. The resultant effect of the state sponsored ethno-linguistic domination was permanent grievances and bitterness against the dominant group by the dominated groups (Teshale 1995).

The ethno-linguistic Amhara domination and assimilation would continue under Emperor Haile Selassie’s administration (1930-1974) and the Derg’s regimes (1975-1991), which deepened ethno-cultural cleavages and national inequality among the varied ethnic groupings that invariably resulted in micro-nationalistic agitations or liberation movements (Gebru 1996; Merera 2004; Temesgen 2015). To be sure, the Derg junta’s national administration was faced with stiff ethnic-based nationalistic liberation movements in the regions (Tewfik 2010). Thus, it is arguable to maintain, from the foregoing analysis, that micro-nationalism or indigeneity and later citizenship problematic in Ethiopia was occasioned by the state administrative policy of ethno-cultural, economic
and political domination by the Amhara ruling elite over others (Getahun 1974; Addis Hiwot 1975). Indeed, the emergence of politically charged micro-nationalisms, which become the dominant forms of liberation struggles in the post-1960 period, could not be divorced from the national oppressive policy of the imperial regimes in Ethiopia (Markakis 1987). Little wonder that, prior to the emergence of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its outer covering, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991, inter/intra ethnic or group conflicts or war5 dominated the history of Ethiopia.

Thus, on its assumption of power in 1991, the TPLF/EPRDF promised to put in place a nation-state of equals by ending ethnic domination and democratise the Ethiopian state and society by ending centuries of autocratic/authoritarian rule (Merera 2004). In fulfilling this promise, the TPLF/EPRDF promulgated into law an ethno-federal constitution in 1994, which gives ethnic nationalities self-governing rights at homelands and rights of secession from the state, as a way out of the inter/intra ethnic logjams occasioned by the longstanding ethnic-domination and centralised state policies. But despite the introduction of ethnic federalism, centralization of power and resources continue and the TPLF/EPRDF has also sought to enforce the dominance Tigrayan group in Ethiopia. Thus, the democratic experience since 1991 in Ethiopia, just as in Nigeria since 1999, has been chequered and tortuous. Also, just like the Nigerian experience, the Ethiopian elites deliberately infuse ethno-religious identities into the administration of the state to satisfy their quest for power and dominance. In fact, the introduction of federalism in the two states was not to ensure grassroots participation in governance, but as a divide and rule strategy to perpetually turn the multinationals against each other while the power holders perpetuate themselves in power. Such strategy, involves ensuring that citizenship and rights are only accessible through primordial ethnic belonging in ‘indigenous community’ and in seeing co-nationals ‘as strangers in our locality’.

4. CITIZENSHIP PROVISIONS IN THE ETHIOPIAN AND NIGERIAN CONSTITUTIONS

As noted earlier, there is an inseparable link between the state and citizenship as each mutually reinforces the other. In international law, each state is left with the right to determine who qualifies as its citizen. In fact, the perquisites of becoming a citizen are usually a matter of national law and vary from state to state. However, in most cases citizenship is acquired by being born within a state’s territory (jus soli), by descent, which means being born to parents who are citizens of a state (jus sanguinis), marriage, naturalization and registration. Basically, the Article 6 of the Ethiopian 1995 Constitution deals with citizenship (the constitution uses the world ‘nationality’ instead). The constitution in article 6(1) states that ‘any person of either sex shall be an Ethiopian national where both or either parent is Ethiopian’ (FDRE 1995). Similarly, the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (as amended) in section 25(1) states that the following persons are citizens of Nigeria by birth – namely –

a. every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria;

b. every person born in Nigeria after the date of independence either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents is a citizen of Nigeria; and

c. every person born outside Nigeria either of whose parents is a citizen of Nigeria (FRN 1999).

Thus, citizenship by birth is constitutionally determined in Ethiopia and Nigeria through descent (jus sanguinis). It must be stated that citizenship by descent in the two countries is equally based on ‘ethnic community/group’ belonging. Furthermore, citizenship can be acquired in both countries through naturalization and registration with different requirements. For instance, in Ethiopia a person of maturity, apart from fulfilling other requirements paramount among which is understanding of the local language of one of the ethnic nationalities, must have had an upward legal residency of four (4) years in Ethiopia, fifteen (15) years of legal residency, good character and immersion in the culture of a local community are required in Nigeria. Also, while there is no gender discrimination in the rights of citizens who married foreign nationals to confer Ethiopian citizenship on their spouses, only men can pass citizenship to their foreign spouses in Nigeria (Article 33 of FDRE 1995 Constitution; Sections 27-28 of 1999 Constitution as amended).

Moreover, while dual nationality is prohibited in Ethiopia (see Article 20 of the Ethiopian Nationality Proclamation 378/2003), dual citizenship is permissible for those on citizenship by birth in Nigeria, though the constitution prohibits those seeking public offices from having dual nationality (Sections 27, 28, 66, 107, 137 and 182 of 1999 Constitution as amended). But the Appellate Court in Ogbide v. Osula (NWLR 2004: 86) held that dual citizenship is not a ground of disqualification for public office for Nigerian citizen from birth. Also in the case of Ethiopia, especially since 2002, ‘foreign nationals of Ethiopian origin’ may be issued special identity cards that entitle the holder to various benefits (Manby 2016). Worthy of note also is the fact regarding how nationality was acquired, all nationals have equal rights, especially political right to seek and hold public office, in Ethiopia (Article 18 Ethiopian Nationality Proclamation 378/2003). However, in Nigeria naturalised citizens are barred from holding the presidency and may not be appointed ministers (See sections 131 and 147(3) of 1999 constitution, as amended).

5 There was civil war in Ethiopia which started on 12 September when the Marxist Derg deposed Emperor Haile Selassie in a coup d’état and lasted till 1991 when EPRDF, a coalition of rebel groups, overthrew the Derg's regime.
More still, as a proof of nationality, every Ethiopian national that has attained the age of majority is issued with a national identity card, while that of minors shall be entered in the national identity cards of their parents (Article 13, Ethiopian Nationality Proclamation 378/2003). In Nigeria, though the national identity card was recently introduced, there is still no law making it a proof of citizenship in the country. In fact, constitutional proof of citizenship in Nigeria is very queasy other than being born to parents/grandparents who were/are Nigerian citizens by birth. Though the National Population Commission (NPC) has been responsible with issuance of birth certificate, such certificate has limited influence in proving a person’s nationality in Nigeria. Usually, in practise, to assess the state and its institutions and by extension proof one’s citizenship in Nigeria, a person must have an ancestral link or be accepted as member of a group or community ‘indigenous’ to a particular locality. This proof or acceptance is by a ‘certificate of origin/indigeneship’ issued by local governments to those accepted as indigenous to such localities. How this practice contributes to citizenship dilemmas in the two countries will be elaborated upon in the next section.

It is however, important to point out that the constitutions of the two countries provide for fundamental human rights and other rights such as economic, social, and political. Also the constitutions provide that all citizens enjoy these rights on equal basis as no citizen shall be discriminated against on the grounds of place of origin, race, nation, nationality, or other social origin, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status (Article 25 FDRE 1995 Constitution; Section 15 1999 Constitution, as amended). To what extent can it be argued that these countries have been sincere to this socio-political objective of ensuring equality of all citizens? Or how has the practice of ethno-federalism and consociational democracy impacted on the inclusive citizenship objectives of the two states? To answer these questions, the federal and consociational practices in Ethiopia and Nigeria is examined in detail in the next section.

5. ETHNO-FEDERALISM AND CITIZENSHIP DILEMMAS IN ETHIOPIA AND NIGERIA

Given the failure of centralised unitary state to ensure national unity and douse inter-ethnic conflicts in Africa, federalism emerged, towards the end of last century, as the best policy options for multietnic states. Thus, federalism could be said to have been adopted in Ethiopia and Nigeria to mitigate the exacerbation and intensity of ethnic tensions and conflicts mainly caused by ethno-cultural clientelism where political cum ethnic entrepreneurs result to the politicisation of ethnic identities in their quests for key political and economic positions. Coincidentally, the two countries are one of the most populous and ethnically plural states in Africa. Also, the two states have experienced military rule and civil war occasioned majorly by elitist inter-ethnic rivalry and vying for the control of the state and its resources. Thus, while Ethiopia broke from its long history of undemocratic institutional centralisation of power and embraced constitutional federalism in 1991, Nigeria could be said to have been a federal state, albeit only on paper, since its independence in 1960.

The two states adopted ethno-federal institutional designs as the best policy options to assuage real/perceived historical injustice. Ethiopia is divided into 9 state regions with the regions hierarchically sub-divided into zones, woredas, special-woredas and kebeles (Temesgen 2015) to reflect dominance of ethno-cultural-religious cleavages. Similarly, Nigeria is arranged into 36 states and 774 local government areas (LGAs) along ethno-cultural fault lines. In terms of organization, the federations involve consociational policies, which include federal institutions providing legal and cultural autonomy to ethno-cultural communities. For instance, in Ethiopia all nationalities or peoples have unconditional constitutional right to self-determination, including the right to secession, the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history (Article 39, FDRE 1995 Constitution). In fact, to exercise these rights, the Ethiopian constitution provides that:

“every nation, nationality and people... has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in the state and federal governments”. The constitution defines a nation, nationality and people as “a group of people who have or share large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory” (Article 39(4-5), FDRE 1995 Constitution).

Similar provisions can be found in the 1999 Nigerian constitution, as amended. Specifically, the Nigerian constitution states that:

“the composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria ... that there shall be no preponderance of persons from a few State or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies” (Section 14(3) 1999 Constitution, as amended. Emphasis added).
The constitution further encourages the sub-national governments (states and LGAs) to ensure that their compositions and those of their agencies reflect the diversity of the people within their areas of authority. The constitution also established a Federal Character Commission with one person to represent each of the states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja for the purposes of ensuring adherence to the federal character principle. However, while the Nigeria sovereignty belongs to the people of Nigeria (Section 14(2a) 1999 Constitution, as amended), political sovereignty is vested in the ‘nations, nationalities, and peoples in Ethiopia (Article 8, FDRE 1995 Constitution).

But just how have these constitutional provisions and other consociational policies resulted in citizenship problematic in Ethiopia and Nigeria? From the wordings of the foregoing provisions in the two constitutions (FDRE 1995 Constitution, Nigerian 1999 Constitution) one would see that their framers wanted to use them to promote political objectives of building a united state and promoting mutual obligations between the state and citizens. Indeed, the objectives of the two states, as stated in their constitutions, are the promotion of national integration and equality of all citizens. To be sure, the two states make adequate provisions for the protection of fundamental human rights (Chapter 3, FDRE 1995 Constitution; Chapter 4, Nigerian 1999 Constitution). Where the problem lies, however, has been in the implementation of the laws and the socio-political practices in the two states.

To be sure, the two states remain federations only on paper, as the sub-national governments’ autonomy is seriously eroded. In Ethiopia for instance, since the introduction of ethnic-federation in 1991, no ethnic nationality has been allowed to secede despite secessionist agitations and apart from linguistic and cultural autonomy, the sub-national governments have not sufficiently been able to exercise administrative and political autonomy (Abbink 2011; Merara 2004). Similarly, despite the constitutional guaranty autonomy for sub-national units in Nigeria, over the years the central government have tended to control more power and state resources. But, despite the weakening autonomy of the sub-national unit, it has been the major source of national citizenship in the two countries. To be sure, a person is a Nigerian by birth “either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria or by naturalisation if “he is ... acceptable to the local community in which he is to live permanently, and has been assimilated into the way of life of Nigerians in that part of the Federation” (Sections 25(1a) and 27(1d) respectively, 1999 Nigeria Constitution, as amended). At the risk of repetition, similarity could be drawn between the foregoing provisions in Nigerian constitution and Articles 6 and 8 of Ethiopian constitution.

The implication of the foregoing constitutional provisions for citizenship is that a person only becomes a citizen through her/his membership of an ethnic community at the sub-national level. That is a person must, first and foremost, be accepted or has ancestral link with one of the indigenous communities/nationalities before becoming either Ethiopian or Nigeria. In Nigeria the proof of belonging to indigenous community is, as noted earlier, a certificate of origin, which is administered by the LGAs since the upper levels of government – i.e. the state and federal – lack sufficient local knowledge to determine who is indigenous to a community (NRN 2014). A similar practice can be found in national identity card in Ethiopia. The card can only be issued to an Ethiopian national who is resident or belonging to a family residing in a particular Kebele and usually known as Kebele Card (www.wikiprocedure.com). The Kebele card, it must be noted is the licence to accessing the Ethiopian Origin ID Card for foreign nationals of Ethiopian descent. To be sure, an Ethiopian with National ID card must prove to the authority that a foreign national of Ethiopian origin is actually an ‘indigene’ and belong to indigenous family of a Kebele.

From the foregoing analysis it is discernible to observe that the two countries have hierarchical citizenship structure namely local, state, and national citizenships. But, local citizenship is superior since the other levels of citizenship depend on it. To be sure, in the context of Nigeria, one can only be appointed minister if s/he is an indigene of a state proven by an LGA’s certificate of origin. Indeed, a person’s citizenship rights dwindle immediately s/he moves out of her/his ‘local government of origin’ where s/he can authenticate her/his indigeneity. This becomes more problematic in Ethiopia where constitutionally sovereignty resides in the nations, nationalities and peoples and where all governments tend to restrict political participation in the ethnically defined regions to those who are indigenes. For example, and in accordance with Article 5(1) of FDRE 1995 Constitution, the federal electoral law excludes nationals who do not speak local languages from seeking elective positions in the ethnic regions.

Worthy of note is that defining citizenship based on primordial hierarchical belonging as indigenes and non-indigenes is at the heart of many annihilating inter-group crisis in the two states. For instance, the protracted conflicts between the ‘Jos indigenes’ and the Hausa/Fulani community in the Jos North Local Government of Plateau State over the control of the LGA is typical of the picture being painted here. Similar case in Nigeria is the crisis between Tiv and Jukun ethnic groups over the control of Wukari LGA in Taraba state. Also, in Ethiopia, the ethno-federalist limitations of resources and opportunities only to those who reside in their ethnic homelands and denial of same to those who do not (non-titular) have often resulted in conflicts between the titular and the non-titular groups (Abbink 2011; Adegehe 2009). Such conflicts are widespread in the ethnically defined regional states. A case in view is the repeated expulsion of the northern (re)settlers of “Amhara” origin from Wallaga with the connivance of the local authorities (Abbink 2011). This must have informed Donald Horowitz’s argument that ‘federalism through proliferation of centres of power decentralises conflicts and makes sub-national administrative units objects of competitions’ (Horowitz 1985).
Furthermore, another implication of ethno-federalism for citizenship is that it led to what Abbink (2011) refers to as ‘territorialisation of ethnicity: ethnicity was territorialized, where exclusivist tendencies, and forms of mixture did not really fit the scheme, especially in towns and cities, which were almost by definition mixed and pluralist’. Here, the boundary between indigene and non-indigene is closed and there is no way a non-indigene could ever become indigene in the same community. This runs counter to the pre-colonial arrangement when an individual could easily migrate to an area and get acculturated and immersed into the cultures of the new area and thus acquired indigene status of the new place. Thus, due to the freezing of ethnic boundaries, smaller ethnic groups continue to agitate for the creation of their own local administrative units where they can claim indigeneity or local citizenship. With this, they believe they get their own ‘slice of the national cake’ and have license to control their own local territories, ‘our heritage’. In the Ethiopian case, this might be due to the fact that various Regional States constitutions have clause that the “sovereignty” in the Region resides in the majority ethnic group or people, thus excluding the other inhabitants (Abbink 2011). All this may lead to local exclusionary claim-making and at times lethal border disputes or autonomy agitations.

Thus, the most detrimental implication of ethno-federal indigeneity-based citizenship is the “country’s disaggregation into hundreds of tiny principalities runs on the basis of indigene sovereignty” (Oladeji 2012). Moreover, it has shifted the site of conflict from the central state to the homelands since, as pointed out before, the control of the locality guarantees access to other sources of resources namely the state and federal governments. Put differently, the concept of national citizenship of equal rights, benefits and duties for all citizens has been attenuated or bifurcated, with the state sunk in a cesspool of inter-group struggles and conflicts over the distribution of public goods (Adejumobi 2001). This must have led Painter and Philo (1995) to argue that ‘there is an ever-present danger when the link between citizenship and space is not only aiming to define citizens against those outside the state, but is also turned inward by those in power who seek to exclude and in some cases expel those deemed undesirable.’ Little wonder, today, all over Ethiopia and Nigeria there is the ever present tension between the multi-ethnic groupings of the countries divided along those indigenous and those seen as settlers within localities over access to social-cultural, economic and political resources/power.

From the foregoing analysis it is safe to argue that ethno-federal constitutional and institutional arrangements are quite problematic for citizenship and rights. This is because it is difficult to grant territorial autonomy to ethno-cultural-religious communities and engender national integration through ‘common/national citizenship’ at the same time. In fact, when power dynamics between ethnic communities become unbalanced, this arrangement invariably emboldens secessionist movements without offering any particular advantages in governance and stability (Hale 2004). To be sure, the introduction of ethno-federalism in Ethiopia has not put paid to secessionist agitations till date as typified by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) agitating for the independent of Oromia from Ethiopia. Similarly, despite the three years of civil war and the defeat of the Biafran State by the Nigerian military in 1970, the agitation for the secession of Biafra from Nigeria has not died. In fact, it has received a new vigour under the newly formed Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOD) whose mandate is to lead Biafran people (the Igbo) out of Nigeria.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the analysis of the federalist experiences in Ethiopia and Nigeria, this paper have been able to establish that the adoption of the ethno-federal constitutional and institutional arrangements by the two states is quite problematic for citizenship and rights. This is majorly because the arrangements devolved power to ethno-cultural sub-national units to reverse real/perceived historical injustice and guaranty political participation based on indigeneity and not as common citizens. This tends to move sovereignty away from the central state towards sub-national administrative units run on the basis of indigeneity. Instead of reversing longstanding inter/intra group suspicions and conflicts, ethnofederalism tends to exacerbate the crisis. But just what can be done to ensure inter group harmony and national integration based on common citizenship in ethnically plural states like Ethiopia and Nigeria?

A major response to this question is the ‘state-nation’ approach (Stephan, Linz and Yadev 2011). In a major work: Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies, Stephan et al. (2011) argue that the most prominent advantage of federalism and consociational systems in plural societies is the offering of recognition and autonomy to potential secessionist minorities and the developing of a sense of national pride around joint participation in and ownership of national institutions (Kendhammer 2014). Their institutional proposals for achieving this balance, what they call the ‘nested policy grammar of state-nations’, is premised on many of the same choices, as observed in the preceding sections, African nations already make, including official recognition for ‘collective rights’ (including state support for multiple languages and religions), as well as electoral institutions that force ethnic constituencies into broad coalitions at the federal level. But as important as these accommodations are, Stepan et al. also recognize the importance of building some measure of national community, particularly through access to ‘polity-wide’ careers, and personal opportunities limit the need to rely on ethnic and ‘primordial public’ networks (Stepan et al., 2011, pp. 17–22). But as observed from the preceding section, the experiences in Ethiopia and Nigeria showed that the ‘state-nation’ approach is equally problematic in resolving ethnic issues and citizenship dilemmas in Africa.
However, to resolve the citizenship quagmire as occasioned by indigeneity in Africa, there is need for negotiation, consensus-building and strategic alliance by the elites of the different ethnic groups. This may take informal mode of social networking in market places, working places, neighbourhoods, community development associations, faith based organizations, etc with a view to deemphasising community belonging on the basis of indigeneity. For instance, average citizens need to regard co-nationals as brothers and sisters belonging to the same church or mosque, buying and selling in the same market, suffering the consequences of bad leadership and governance together not on the basis of primordial ethnic or religious belonging. This will also involve accessing campaign promises of politicians on their merit and their capacity of resolving common problems but not on the ethno-cultural-religious affiliations. The recent collection action of the Oromo and Amhara groups in Ethiopia as common sufferers of naked abuse, discrimination, and marginalisation is very commendable. In fact, the slogan of the protesters is “the blood flowing in Oromia is our blood too” (Awol 2016). He sees the protests as the greatest threat to the Ethiopian government, which will probably force the type of reform the elites could not achieve for decades – inclusive citizenship for all Ethiopians.

On the part of government, there is urgent need to deracialise the public space and democratise citizenship and rights through constitutional means. This will involve limiting indigeneity rights to certain traditional rites, rituals, titles and stools. That is, the ‘indigenous peoples’ in a region, state or locality should be made to understand that customary rights are distinct from political rights within their localities. For instance, the ascension to Kingship or Chiefdom position of a community should be the exclusive preserve of the indigenes. In the same way, citizenship and political rights should be based on continuous residency in any part of the state. That is, while a person’s indigenousness cannot change, her/his citizenship status based on residency can change over time. For instance, a man born to a family indigenous to Ondo town will forever remain an Ondo indigene. However, as a Nigerian, s/he may become a Citizen of Kano State if s/he chooses to become a resident in Kano for constitutionally stipulated number of years. With such ‘resident citizenship’ s/he aspires to any political public office of her/his choice including the governorship seat of Kano State. What this does is that it separates a ‘cultural citizen’ from a ‘constitutional/political citizen’ with different rights. To be sure, a constitutional citizen can reside in any part of the state with full citizenship status and rights, while a cultural citizen is limited to a particular community where s/he can claim customary rights. Thus, appointment or election for the purposes of governance should be based on someone’s residency in a place and not on indigeneity.

Lastly, there is urgent need for good governance that will take mass of the people out of the pond of poverty. The resources of the state must be deployed to deliver development and to create happiness for the greater number of the citizens. The current selective governance, which tends to favour certain ethno-cultural clientelistic group, must stop. The political leadership must see the entire state as her/his constituency and therefore deploy resources according to each regions needs without ethno-cultural group biases.

7. REFERENCES


