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THE EMBEZZLEMENT OF VILLAGE BUDGET BY APPARATUS: A CASE STUDY IN EAST LOMBOK DISTRICT OF WEST NUSA TENGGARA PROVINCE, INDONESIA

Mai Hendra Subiantoro

Student, Post Graduate Study in Accountancy
Program of University of Mataram, West Nusa
Tenggara, Indonesia
mai.hendra.subiantoro@gmail.com

Endar Pituringsih

Lecturer, Post Graduate Study in Accountancy
Program of University of Mataram, West Nusa
Tenggara, Indonesia
endar07ringsih@yahoo.co.id

ABSTRACT

As a result of the implementation of the Village Law No.6 of 2014 in Indonesia and the Government Regulation No. 60 of 2014 on village grants derived from the state budget of revenues and expenditures, villages have received a large number of grants. Unfortunately, most of the grants are managed in an unorganized manner, allowing for the embezzlement of village budgets by unscrupulous personnel. Through an qualitative approach, this study aims to find out how and why fraud occurs. This research used phenomenology method to describe informants/subjects experiences, who have been working around the suspected corruption environment. the research found that indicate corruption was more prevalent in infrastructure projects. The Village Heads in fact played a role in exacerbating corruption. The regulations applied to control corruption have not been maximally succeeded in preventing or stopping corruption.

Keywords

Village Budget, Corruption, Indonesia, East Lombok Regency.

1. INTRODUCTION

Corruption contributes to the poverty and decline of a country. Indonesia is a country affected by corruption. Transparency International's research in 2016 revealed that Corruption Perception Index (CPI) or Indonesia's corruption rank is in 90th from 176 countries. Compared to 2015, Indonesia's corruption rating increased by one point. During 2016, the region is still an epicenter of corruption. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) data shown 398 cases of 482 corruption cases handled by law enforcement officers during the period occurred in the local bureaucracy, including village budget corruption.

The Implementation of the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 6 Year 2014 on the Village has consequences on the occurrence of village budget corruption. The Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs of Indonesia No. 113 of 2014 as a derivative of Law 6 of 2014 which regulates the mechanism of village financial management gives a great authority and power to the village head in managing the village finances. As a result, village budget corruption cases are widespread in all parts of Indonesia, including the eastern Lombok district.

In 2015, Corruption Eradication Commission of Republic of Indonesia (KPK-RI) found some potential embezzlement or misapplication of village budget management. The most crucial problem related to it is that it is lack of transparency and accountability. These were in line with the findings of FITRA (Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency), which revealed that about 4.9 billion rupiah of village budget have been corrupted.

In East Lombok Regency, village budget corruptions have occurred during 2015 to 2017. The Inspection Report of East Lombok Regency Inspectorate mentioned that the state was harmed about Rp.2.04 billion or about USD 15,203. The findings of the regular audit and special audit investigations, show an increasing percentage trend of financial embezzlement in East Lombok Regency, are presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Trend of the increasing of embezzlement case of village budget in East Lombok Regency during 2015-2017. (Source: Annual Report of the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) of East Lombok Regency, 2017).

In this context, this research article focuses on analyzing how corruption of village budgets in Indonesia takes a case study in East Lombok District. The purposes of the present study were to: (1) identify the pattern or mode of corruption in the use of village budgets, (2) analyze the role of village head as the most influential actor in village budget corruption, and (3) find out the weaknesses of existing rules as inputs for prevention steps. This research article comprises four parts including the foundation of theory, methodology, research results, and closures.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON THE VILLAGE RURAL CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA

Corruption in government bureaucracy in Indonesia has been a concern of many researchers, including issues of corruption at the village level. Some researchers have tried to portray the corruption that occurred in the village from various approaches. Research conducted by Batubara (2016) is one of them. The study aims to look for the determinants of corruption in the village government in Indonesia in the context of a more decentralized government system. The results revealed that the decentralization aspect through village budget autonomy has a positive correlation with the occurrence of corruption.

Another study by Purnomo (2015) looked at corruption in the village from the financial position of the village in the state's financial system. The study set out from the condition where the elements of corrupt acts against village deviation are still in conflict with the interpretation of the law in capturing the perpetrators of corruption in the Village Head, but on the other side of the fact that many village chiefs or village tools are caught in a criminal offense for deviant use of village finance. The findings revealed one of them that the illegal act of managing the village's finances was based on abuse of office attached to the Village Head.

Studies were also reported by Woodhouse (2002) on how to fight village corruption in Indonesia. The report prepared by the World Bank consultant as part of the World Bank's assistance program in Indonesia. The results show that political change and decentralization that impacted the village, has brought a lot of corruption in line with the size of the village-managed budget. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent the occurrence of corruption. Through development programs in "kecamatan" or sub district, corruption prevention measures have been achieved through increased incentives or welfare of village providers, information disclosure and increased community participation.

Corruption also occurs because of the personal aspect, so it is necessary to look at it from another approach such as the leadership behavior. Green et al. (1979) has proven that corruption in budget use was heavily influenced by leaders' behavior. Similarly Jones's research (2005), then Goldman (2006); Guo et al. (2016) and Alemu (2016) strengthen the Green et al. findings. Their results revealed that there was a strong positive correlation between leadership effectiveness (leadership performance) and organizational behavior.

Based on dimensions of behavior that deviate in works, it contributes to the occurrence of irregularities in public companies or organizations (Robinson, 2009).

Paino *et al.* (2011) stated that the aspect of the attitudes of the people involved, play very important role in achieving the optimum organization objectives. Pinto *et al.* (2008) found and revealed that the prevalence of corruption in the united state organization as high level category, such as by wasting budget, stealing, and blunder in organization management.

3. METHODOLOGY

This research is a qualitative research. The approach used is interpretation phenomenology. Phenomenology approach is used and purposed to understand the response of human kind's existence and to understand their social interaction experiences. While interpretation approach is used to interpret or to understand, nor to explain, and to predict as what stated in the positivism paradigm (Burel and Morgan, 1979). Ricoeur (2014) asserted that interpretation is an attempt to dig the meanings that are still hidden or contained in language and text.

This research has been conducted for two months, from October to November 2017 in East Lombok Regency. The study was carried out in two main steps. The first step was applying of official research permits from Mataram University and Local Development Planning Agency of East Lombok Regency, and then following by in situ data collection.

Data collection was conducted according to official letter permit No. 070/077/XI/2017, consisted of interview, observation, and documentary study. Interview processes were conducted through the involvement of subjects or informants from Officer for Management of Finance, village apparatus, village counselor, government institution, and non-government organization (NGO) with different village counselors. Observations were conducted by visiting the villages, recommended by the informants, in where corruption may potentially occur. Finally, documentary study was done by tracing out any documents that supporting and related to this research, including library or literature studies.

4. RESULTS OF RESEARCH AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Results of Research

4.1.1 *Operandi mode of corruption on village budget.*

One important phase in village finance management is to use the budget. This phase is about the implementation of the project which includes the phase after the planning and the phase before taking accountability for the project. From all, the implementation phase of the budget takes more risk of corruption.

Audit results of Inspectorate of East Lombok Regency showed that there were some village projects indicating corruption. From both regular investigation (audit) and special investigation over the last three years, the Inspectorate found that the lost may be about more than 2.04 billion rupiah or equal to 15,203,- USD. Such much lost was assumed to be smaller than of the actual lost, since the limited capacity and affordability of the inspectorate officer to detect the whole corruption indicators.

The phase of budget using is the most risk phase that easily leads to misappropriations of use indicating corruption if it is compared with other phases of village budget management. It was known from the modus operandi and the frequency of the corruption. From some cases related to this problem, the following were some modus operandi that commonly used by the apparatus.

The first was fictitious procurement of good and project. This modus operandi was found many and it was also admitted by East Lombok Inspectorate officer, Ms. Kuni Diniyati, who said:

“Fictitious procurement of good and project are mostly found in the programs which are not directly related to the village physical projects, such as capital share ownership of BUMdes (Village owned enterprises), funding Family Welfare Movement (PKK) programs, youth organization programs, and village security agency (BKD) programs”.

Through this modus operandi, most of the doers or active persons believe that they will not be questioned in detailed by both inspectorate officer and BPK (the Audit Board of Indonesia). Therefore the apparatus are not afraid to do corruption. The strategy that they used was actually simple, i.e. through making fictitious accountability reports, providing fictitious receipts of goods purchased, and fictitious money receipts. Meanwhile the whole money was used or taken privately by the apparatus and most of them were the Head of Villages.

Secondly was reduction of physical project volume or infrastructure projects. In accordance with the causes, corruption is not always caused by misappropriations of act. Some are caused by human resources of the apparatus that take responsible for the budget plan (RAB). One of the subjects (informants) in this study, Mr. A1, the Village Head of Kecamatan Keruak (Keruak District) did not agree very much that if the act is called corruption, by stating:

“If the work does not succeed or less than expectation, it does not mean that it is deliberately done or much worse corrupted. We admit that there must be wrong in the budget plan (RAB) and again it is not a corruption”.

This unilateral claim does not show the truth, since, on the other hand, the findings indicated that there was corruption in budget plan (RAB), even it was concluded that the corruption was deliberately intended from the beginning of budget plan (RAB) making. This fact was admitted by the secretary of Melon village, of Jerowaru District who doesn't want his name mentioned here.

“I know that they both TPK (Project Implementation Team) and the Village Head cooperate. All project volume was reduced deliberately including the project quality because they think that it would not be examined in detail by the superintendents. They actually could get profit if they work under budget plan (RAB), but they want more and do think it is not enough” he said.

Mr. B1, Head of Technical Implementation for Village Finance Management (PTPKD), also as Village Secretary, realized that the way of Village Head and TPK work disappointed him very much. The reasons were because the Village Head and TPK worked without involving other related village apparatus. These two positions of Mr. B1 are vital and important for the payment process and management of all project executed. Unfortunately, the Village Head preferred having his own treasurer staff instead of him.

Third, budget cuts. The ways that they used in budget cuts were mostly through hacking wages of staffs and giving funds to community groups. Mr. Irsyad Sadikin, an auditor in Inspectorate Office of East Lombok, explained in detail his findings, as follows:

“Budget cuts are actually caused by the ignorance and weakness of the fund receivers. Then this situation is utilized (for personal benefit) by the doers (i.e. the apparatus), such as to cut the village staffs wages, because the doers knew that they (the staffs) will never make it problem or will never complain. While cadres of POSYANDU (Post Family Planning Services - Integrated Health) do not know how much wages that they can earn precisely. Hence when their wages are cut, they do not know at all, and if they do, they do not dare say anything”.

In addition to budget cuts, some misused of funds that most people complained about was funds for rehabilitation of uninhabitable housing (RTLH). Here, people who are deemed to receive funds to build their houses, will not be given money but the materials, and the materials value is not as much as they should earn, i.e. about ten million rupiah (around USD 750) for each house.

The aspect that leads the apparatus to manipulate the funds easily is the ignorance of the funds receivers. The receivers of the fund do not know detail of the information about the fund they will have, including the amount of the fund. The information they have only that they will be funded for their houses rehabilitation. Village head and sub village head play the most important role in cutting the village budget.

If we look at the law, the practice of misappropriated acts in budget use is contrary to the prevailing rules and regulations. Minister of Home Affairs Regulation Number 113 year 2014 on village finance management rules the mechanism of budget use transparency and accountability.

Fourth, the project was done by the third party. Misappropriation of budget used and management cooperating with the third party were considered new mode, especially in physical and infrastructure projects. Whereas, in accordance with the regulation related to procurement of good and service, village projects shall be carried out through self-management mechanism. While in fact, the projects that undertaken by the third party were the procurement of the materials.

Irregular acts indicating that corruption suspected be carried out by the apparatus was hard to be detected since it was kept and classified internally by the village team for finance management. This was in line with the statement of B2, the village secretary of Mawar Village, Jerowaru sub district. Who said that

“Village head doesn't want to get hectic, hence the physical projects, such as pathways, roads hoarding, village health centre (s) developments, and others are sub contracted to- or are undertaken by the third party. What the village head knows is only the fee, which is about 10% from the third party. The third party is usually the project implementation team (TPK), who carried out the whole projects. TPK head just give 10% to the village head”.

The way they manipulate the project fund through transferring the projects to third party was contrary to the prevailing rules. Regulation of the minister of finance of Republic of Indonesia number 49/PMK.07/2016 article 22 verse 2 states that the implementation of the village projects shall be carried out through self-management with local material resources and empowering local people.

4.1.2 Village head in the circle of corruption of village budget.

Corruption on the use of village budget involves many aspects, including mentality of the apparatus. Some audit investigation findings show that finance management officer play important role in any village corruption, even the management officer is the doer of the corruption.

As a peak leader in the village, village head also has power to manage the all funds as budget use authority (KPA) of the village budget. It is stated in Home Affairs Minister Regulation, article 1, verse 12 number 113 year 2014 on Village Budget Management Guidelines, that village head as one of the apparatus having authority in village budget management. In addition, it is also described in article 1 verse 6, which says that village budget management includes planning, implementation, administration, reporting, and accountability. This special authority of the village head does not always mean good but sometimes means worse. Position as a village head is prestigious and powerful. If it is used right, it will bring prosperity for the people of the village on the other hand if it is used inappropriately it will lead to manipulation and corruption.

Referring to the findings of East Lombok Inspectorate Audit, of 29 cases, most of them were village heads. This phenomena affirmed that misappropriated acts indicating corruption and were caused by the village heads in misunderstanding their power and authority given by the regulation.

There were some mistaken or misunderstood of village heads in interpreting the power and the authority. One of them was that village head did not involve other parties, such as Project Implementation Team (TPK), Technical Implementation for Village Finance Management (PTPKD), Village Representatives Board (BPD), and others, in planning and designing the projects. On the other hand, there were some other village heads who transferred all their power and authority to those parties on condition that the village heads had been given much more fee.

Mr. A2, a village head of Manggis Village, Keruak Sub district mentioned that the mechanism of village budget management was well-designed and well-prepared and it was clear in the regulation. However it was no need to be precisely as the way it is, since every village has its own characteristic and therefore it needs to be adjusted. He did not agree to call it corruption. He argued:

“Just in my village with very limited recourses, any supporting village organization that we formed did not run effectively. TPK and PTPKD members are slow-motion workers and therefore we could not work with them, hence I initiated to take over the whole power and authority to affect the projects. In this case, it doesn't mean that I broke the rules or corrupted”.

This situation cannot be a justification to say that taking all authorities in budget and project management are all right. It needs to keep it in mind that it doesn't comply with the prevailing rules and regulations. In accordance with the mechanism, village budget management shall involve parties such TPK, PTPKD, BPD, and others, actively and proportionally. This involvement will ease the projects to be implemented and will anticipate or minimize the irregularities since every party can control others and can restrain the power and authority of the budget use authority (KPA), in this case the village head authority.

Some cases may describe clearly that the mechanism of village budget management is lack of participation and risk of misappropriation of act. Budget cuts and transferring projects are two of modus operandi that indicated the presence of other party's role cuts involved in village budget management.

Ms. Fitriah, a village counselor who was on duty in Keruak Sub district elaborated her experiences over last two years. Her main duty was to supervise the implementation of village budget management. The large amount of village budget has created many villages became unable to use it properly since they have not enough human resources to handle and to manage the money well.

The impact that Ms. Fitriah felt not easy as a coordinator of village counselor in Keruak sub district was that there were many conflicts among the apparatus who were involved in budget management. Also the conflicts between the apparatus and the people of the village where the projects were implemented. All problems were mostly caused by the way village head used his authority. In this case the village head usually uses his power without discussing with other parties and he tends to put on his staff and other parties under pressure. Ms. Fitriah then talked about her experiences in a village where she became a counselor:

“Our duty is to be active giving inputs and suggestions or even critics to all villages where we work in, but there were some villages refused to be supervised by any counselor. Those who declined actually have broken the law and regulation. They might forget that we work under command of law and regulation” she said.

This rejection from being supervised meaning that the village heads are assumed to hide the corruption or are trying to cover it. And it is approved that between rejection and corruption are related. Take some complaints of village people to consider, meaning that where village counselor is rejected, there will many complaints from people will emerge, even the village heads where counselor was rejected arrested by the police because of corruption and some of them were finally sentenced by the court.

People solidarity for transparency (SOMASI) of West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) has noted a lot about how villages corrupted their budget. Since it was created in the era of reformation, SOMASI as an NGO that concerns on corruption investigation in any government institution has established counselors to supervise and watch how villages manage their budget and it agrees with the implementation of Law No. 6 year 2014 on village and with government regulation No. 60 year 2014 on village budget. Considering the village budget is huge, it is assumed that there will be many problems emerge in every village where human resources are less.

This is a reasonable enough and not a hoax. The director of SOMASI NTB, Mr. Ahyar Supriadi alleged that in the first time when the budget was directly given to every village, SOMASI found human resources of the village had not been prepared yet and did not know how the apparatus manage the whole budget. The ability of the apparatus to understand the regulation as the first way to manage the budget was not completely enough. Therefore local and central government performed training and supervision on how they manage well the whole budget.

According to Mr. Ahyar Supriadi, there were some crucial notes that we need to pay attention. First, large amount of the budget has changed the perception of all related parties in the village, especially those who manage the budget. Villages were not becoming an interesting issue before they get that a lot of budget and now they “look like beautiful girls” since they have it. People now compete hard to be head of the village. Second, village now become new places of corruption. This is not a fake or hoax, since almost half of the villages in East Lombok are indicated corruption.

“Principally, as long as the village head works on the right track and cooperate, the village budget will be safe and all of the projects will be easily implemented well and without any problem. But if from the beginning, the village head starts to work incorrectly and doesn’t follow the regulation, then problem will come up and corruption is there. So, everything depends very much on how the village head works” he said.

Role of village head in misappropriation of use of budget management starts from every step of the project management. FITRA (Indonesian Forum for Budget Transparency) NTB has found some problems related to village budget use and management, such as role cuts by the village head for budget management team. This starts from the time the fund of the project is withdrawn. Procedurally, to withdraw the project fund, treasurer is getting involved by signing the bank slip, but FITRA found that it was all done by the village head alone and the treasurer sign or stamp was being falsified.

FITRA NTB then values that the absence of the treasurer in the process of withdrawing the project fund may disturb the implementation and the realization of the whole projects. This situation became worse when the village head was not transparent in the use of the budget. He cut all honorariums or wages for the village staffs, for the treasurers, the cadres of POSYANDU, and even he cut the fund that was allocated for people projects. There was no significant control from other party and staff since they both have inequality of bargaining power and therefore this habit continuously went on.

The other way village head corrupted the budget was through transferring all project process to be performed by the management team that he had chosen although it broke the regulation. This way was the most familiar modus operandi used by the village head to corrupt the budget according to FITRA NTB finding.

Mr. Ervin Kaffah, FITRA NTB coordinator, valued the portrait of the corruption in the village budget reaches the worrying phase. The more money that village has, the more people join to compete in village head election. It showed those villages become new interesting place to work in. But the problem is that the large amount of the budget is mostly corrupted. It doesn’t fulfill effectively what village people need.

4.1.3 Regulation and the slot of corruption of village budget

The use or the realization of budget is a part of village budget management. There were some regulations becoming guidelines in the process of the management of the budget. There are law, government regulations, and minister regulations. Besides having regulations from the central government that rule the way budget is used in general, local government is also recommended to provide another regulation that fits and completes the upper ones. One of them that have been made by East Lombok is Regent Regulation No. 29/2015 on village budget management which finally changes into regent regulation No. 28/2016.

The creation of all regulations is a part of government efforts to ensure that the budget is well-managed and organized for the prosperity of people. Unfortunately, it doesn’t guarantee that it is free of corruption and one of the problems that cause it happen is the slot in the regulations.

The audit findings from the inspectorate office of East Lombok shown that although the regulation is good enough to control, to help, and to lead people of the village to manage and organize the budget, all still depends on the mentality and morality of the people. The teams that manage and organize the projects have to keep the spirit and commitment, especially the village head as the top leader as well as the budget use authority.

Senior auditor of inspectorate office of East Lombok, Ms. Kuni Diniyati suggested that the Regent Regulation No. 28/2016 need to be renewed and improved to make it able to control and reduce corruption. She added that it needs to involve sub district head in the development and supervision phase. This is due to currently the sub district head is not legally involved in the supervision and management; he and his/her staffs have no idea what to do when they see a potential misappropriated use of the village budget.

The weakness of the regulation where sub district head has no right to supervise is complained by him and his staffs. This regulation put him and his staff as outsiders watching. Whereas structurally the village heads are need to coordinate with sub district. Section head for village development of Jerowaru sub district, Mr. Lalu Jub said that no slot for sub district development and supervision will easy village head and apparatus to carry out the project the way they want. And it was impossible that regency government could control directly all about 239 villages and spread up in the large area.

“After the implementation of budget policy for the village, there is no obligation for the village to coordinate so that sub district in this position doesn't know what villages do for their own. We know what happens after people of a certain village report their village head to the police because of corruption”.

Another crucial problem that needs to complete is the procedures and the mechanism of withdrawing the fund. In accordance with the regulation, budget from the central government is withdrawn two times, while another budget such as from ADD (village budget allocation) will be withdrawn three times. The problem is that, the next withdrawal may be carried out by the village treasurer although the obligation of the previous withdrawal is not yet completed.

This situation leads to a risk and cause problem indicating corruption. There were many problems found by FITRA NTB in villages where village were in trouble to complete the administration of the presence withdrawal but prepare to withdraw another fund. This indicated that villages cannot solve their own problems to complete the whole project requirements. This because of the fund has been used for other things. And then in order to complete the projects, the village tried to propose for the next withdrawal.

The weaknesses of the regulation often become slot used by the apparatus of village to manipulate and corrupt. And this effect to the lost of village budget both the national budget and regional budget.

4.2 Discussion

The enactment of Law No. 6 of 2014 on village, has given implications for the embezzlement of village budgets. The budget decentralization policy from the central to the village government, as a consequence of the enactment of the Act, leaves villages with substantial budgets. But because of the mentality of some managers, have causing the village budget to become increasingly misused. Our results above, in line with the results of Batubara (2016) who study on the search for the determinants of corruption in village administrations in Indonesia, which show that decentralization policies in the village have a positive correlation with corruption. This means that decentralization policy through budget allocation from the central government to the village has the potential to generate corruption.

In this study it can be seen that the embezzlement of village budgets had been done in various ways. Reducing the volume of infrastructure work was the most common practice, as well as procurement of fictitious goods and activities, budget cuts and profits from activities or jobs being carried out. These facts have also been reported elsewhere by previous researchers (Olken 2007, Lucas 2016, Al Baiti et al. 2017). This condition occurred because of the dominance role of the village head in the use of budgets without involving other village financial managers such as treasurers and implementing teams.

The practice of manipulating the village budget is clearly contrary to the Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No.113 in 2014 as a derivative regulation of Law No. 6 of 2014, which governs the mechanism of using village budgets in a transparent and accountable manner. In addition, it violates Regulation of the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia No. 49/PMK.07/2016 article 22 paragraph 2 stating that the implementation of activities funded by the Village Fund is done by self-management

Woodhouse (2002) who conducted study on the corruption in the World Bank's District Development Program, in Indonesia revealed that corruption in the organization's environment is characterized by a monopoly of power and low accountability. It means the monopoly of the power that the research meant was the domination of the village chief's role in managing the budget. A similar findings as also reported by Lucas (2016). Furthermore, Purnomo's study (2015) reinforced the findings and revealed that illegal acts against village finance management dictated the abuse of office attached to the Village Head.

In this context, Robinson (2009) looked at the role of the village chief or head in the behavioral dimension; where in work has swerved from the rule, so that the impact on the occurrence of irregularities in the organization. For that reasons it can be understood why then Alemu (2016) stated that the performance of good leadership will have a positive effect on good organizational conditions as well, and vice versa

As reported elsewhere that the embezzlement of village budgets, is closely related to regulations that provide opportunities for corruption, as well as the weakness of law enforcement (Batubara 2016, Al Baiti et al. 2017). In the regards to these, Binh (2014) who conducted research on the analysis of control and monitoring systems in Hai Duong Province, Vietnam, suggested that to minimize the fraud or deviation within the organization can be done by intensifying the system of intensive surveillance as early detection measures. How it can be applied effectively in protection of the embezzlement of village budget by apparatus in Indonesia, further studies need to be carried out.

5. CONCLUSION

Large amount of village budgets has been faced with the challenge of misappropriation in budget usage. Various modes of deviance occurred such as procurement of goods or fictitious activities, reduction in the volume of physical construction or infrastructure works, budget cuts, and "auctioning" activities or favoring physical works. The deviations that occurred could not be separated from the presence of the village head as part of the manager. The great authority of the village head was often misinterpreted. The dominant role, and the actions that suppressed his or her staffs, was the way the village head smoothed the embezzlement practices. Corruptions or distorted in the use of village budgets were also inseparable from the regulation, in this case the Regent of East Lombok Regulation No. 28 of 2016 on the management of village finances that still opens the opportunities for budget deviations.

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